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REMARKS OF THE KEYNOTE SPEAKER, MR. CHESTERFIELD H.
SMITH*
Law Day was inaugurated by the American Bar Association as a day
when citizens reaffirm their dedication to the rule of law and to liberty
as safeguarded by the American system of justice. It is a day to remind
Americans of their responsibility in maintaining and improving our
justice system through personal interest an individual participation. As
in any civilized society, Americans must continually re-evaluate, re-
analyze, and re-structure existing governmental institutions to better
meet the legitimate and ever-expanding needs of our citizens. This Law
Day conference has a broader scope, encompassing the rule of law as it
pertains to the world community of nations.
The significance of East-West trade lies not only in the basic econom-
ics of trade balances and import-export quotas but more importantly in
the real probability that such trade will enhance mutual understanding
and cooperaton between the communist and noncommunist world.
Nations with trade allowances are more likely to enjoy harmonious
relations than are those with no commercial ties. History is witness to
the suffering and anguish which result when peoples and nations fail to
communicate and cooperate with each other. Although fear and mis-
trust characterize relationships between powerful governments of the
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world, in time mankind will discover the means to resolve differences
and to clarify relationships among nations without resorting to armed
conflict. Just as a single nation uses its legal institutions to solve internal
disputes and resolve the concensus of its people, nations will succeed at
an international level. Recent conferences and agreements concluded by
our President with the Soviet Union and China point in that direction.
The increased interrelation of the noncommunist and communist
worlds through business and trade relations will necessarily require the
formation of structures for settling business differences. For example,
trade embargoes may soon be replaced by the granting of most favored
nation trading status. The result will be a stronger reliance upon interna-
tional legal structures and agreements and international courts of arbi-
tration. The early American experience under the new federal system
showed that increased trade and interdependence spawned rules and
legal institutions which eventually replaced force as a means of settling
differences.
Our goal must be to discover effective means whereby every man,
woman, and child can live, travel, and do business anywhere in the world
at all times in peace, dignity, and freedom. The best of human traits
emerge when men interact for a common purpose.
The worldwide spread of court-administered justice is the logical con-
sequence of a full-blown economic relationship among all nations of the
world. The American Bar Association has long recognized that our
responsibility as men who honor and cherish the law transcends the
boundaries of our own country. The time has come for us as men of the
law to unite with the aid of the international legal and business commu-
nitiess communities in the effort to bring all the people of the world
closer together and under the rule of law.
EAST WEST TRADE CONFERENCE
FIRST SESSION, MODERATED BY ADMIRAL WILLIAM C. MOTT*
UNITED STATES GOALS AND POLICY ON
TRADE WITH COMMUNIST NATIONS
William J. Casey**
Phillip M. Landrum***
Steven Lazarust
Jacobus T. Severienstt
REMARKS OF MR. WILLIAM J. CASEY
In seeking to build and expand trade and economic relations between
East and West, the United States hopes to improve standards of living,
to scale down military competition, and to construct a foundation of
economic interdependence on which a structure of peace can be built.
Another objective of our present economic policy is to eliminate the
disadvantages to American businesses caused by Western Europe's and
Japan's ten year headstart in trading with the Soviet Union, Eastern
Europe, and China.
In speculating about the shape of East-West trade one should bear
in mind that although the Chinese will sell raw materials, they will not
permit foreign exploitation or development of their resources. Nor will
the Chinese go into debt.
The Soviets, however, take a broader view. The Soviet Union has
deemphasized traditional trade patterns based principally on the fleeting
character of the price mechanism. They desire to examine other forms
of cooperation, particularly long-term projects related to the develop-
ment of their natural resources. As these projects are implemented, the
Soviets will enjoy the benefit of American markets, equipment, technol-
ogy, and managerial skills, as well as additional foreign exchange. For
the United States, the output of these projects will go not only to the
amortization of capital investment in kind along with a return on capi-
tal, but they will also contribute to the satisfaction of our energy and
raw materials requirements.
To develop such trade American firms will need to cooperate among
themselves and learn to barter their goods for Soviet goods and convert
such goods to cash on the world market. These techniques must neces-
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sarily be developed by the private business system.
Political and economic relations are inextricably intertwined. The
pace of advancement in the economic sphere thus has been regulated by
the pace of advancement in the political sphere. The President's policy
has been to build a lasting interdependence of interests encompassing
the entire spectrum of our relations with the East. We will not attempt
to force negotiations in one area, as in the field of trade, for example,
in order to bring progress in such other areas as political, cultural, or
military affairs. We prefer a balanced approach bringing less dramatic
but more certain developments.
Generally, economic relationships may be considered normalized
when American trading relations are on the same basis as now exist
between communist countries and the rest of the developed world. Spe-
cifically, relations are considered normalized when no embargoes on
special goods exist, diplomatic relations are firmly and fully established,
arbitration procedures are established, public and private debt claims
are settled, maritime, civil aviation, environmental protection and busi-
ness facilitation agreements are concluded, and most favored nation
status is granted on the part of the United States. In this sense, Yugosla-
via and Poland have normal relations with the United States, and U.S.
relations with the Soviet Union and Rumania are approaching normal.
Hopefully, the normalization of economic relations will soon develop
between the U.S. and such countries as Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Bul-
garia, Albania, East Germany, and Mongolia.
As the international system undergoes basic change, trade and mone-
tary reform is urgently needed. Thus, the President is seeking broad new
legislative authority vital to the United States in maintaining its leader-
ship role in the construction of a new international economic order
reflecting today's economic realities. Obstacles to trade annually cost
billions of dollars through inefficient use of resources.
Structural problems in East-West trade require government initiative
in solving problems of trade between market and state-controlled econ-
omies. American ambassadors have been instructed to give trade rela-
tions emphasis. The State Department's commercial staff has been in-
creased, an East-West Trade Policy Committee under the chairmanship
of George Schultz has been created, and commercial negotiations have
been concluded. Only United States policy on strategic trade controls
is not negotiable at this time. However, in cooperation with the Interna-
tional Coordinating Committee (COCOM) the embargo list of strategic
materials is under review and will be reduced.
Financial policy is the key to further East-West trade expansion.
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Communist nations as a group will be net importers of financial re-
sources in the next decade. Old debts must be settled and basic items
such as provisions for credit established. To this end the $800 million
lend-lease settlement with the Soviet Union and the Export-Import
Bank's extension of credit to Poland have proven to be essential. Fur-
ther progress has been made in the forms of competitive bank rates and
terms, agricultural exports, cooperation of private export credit institu-
tions, and negotiation of taxation and licensing agreements.
Americans can learn much about joint ventures from the Japanese
who have had success in this field, particularly in gas and oil arrange-
ments. East European countries with a satisfactory record with joint
ventures are now permitting equity investments. Even the Overseas Pri-
vate Investment Corporation, which is geared to investment in less de-
veloped countries, is operating in Rumania and Yugoslavia.
REMARKS OF CONGRESSMAN PHILLIP T. LANDRUM
International problems have a direct impact on the jobs, incomes, and
living standards of Americans. Not attending to such matters can dim-
inish prosperity at home and provoke friction abroad. The Trade Bill
under consideration by the Congress, though specifically involving tra-
ditional trading partners, inevitably points to nontraditional partners.
Answers to the following questions will determine United States trade
policy with communist nations. Where does the responsibility for fixing
trade policy lie? What is the power of Congress under the Constitution
in foreign trade policy? What is the position of the United States in the
world economy? How can the United States correct its large deficit?
Why are economic relations with communist countries so limited? What
is the effect of trade with communist countries on the national security
of this country? How does such trade affect the traditional trading
partners of the United States? Issues posed by these questions will be
debated at hearings on the Trade Reform Act of 1973 which begin on
May 9.
Politicans must be careful not to let their natural resistance to change
affect their decisions in this situation. It is imperative that the United
States take steps in trade reform, a project more difficult than tax
reform. Many sectors must combine skills to make the changes needed
if the United States is to regain a top position in world trade and
influence. The consequence of idleness in this matter will only lead to
further decline in our international trade.
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REMARKS OF MR. STEVEN LAZARUS
The problem of responsibility for fixing trade policy with foreign
nations involves a process whereby the executive branch proposes and
the legislative branch disposes. A working example of such a process is
the Trade Reform Act of 1973.
The urgency of trade reform is in large measure prompted by the $6.5
billion trade deficit incurred by the United States in 1972, general world
monetary instability, and a shift in market power due to the rapid
economic growth of Japan and Western Europe. In order to return to
the posture of a sharp and competent competitor the United States must
remove artificial trade barriers. Americans will face difficult competi-
tion for the increasingly limited world resources in future years. The
"free trade" policy of past years cannot be allowed to continue in the
face of restrictions placed on access to markets. Markets for American
products must be open abroad as we open our own markets to the
exports of other nations.
There will be no negotiation on trade matters related to security.
However, the United States control list, beyond the multilateral list of
the International Coordinating Committee (COCOM), has shrunk from
550 to 120 items in the past six months and should contain no more than
50 items by the May 29 deadline date set in the Equal Export Opportun-
ity Act of 1972. The list has undergone a systematic review by a govern-
ment interagency panel.
The United States must maintain its strength during trade negotia-
tions. This requires that our negotiators be candid and show respect for
the other party and at the same time maintain their own dignity and self-
respect. Generally, the most satisfactory results come from long periods
of difficult negotiations.
Although a major strength of the United States in foreign trade is the
diversity, flexibility and initiative of the private sector, our political
institutions will also play a major role in the establishment of East-West
trade relations. Our system of checks and balances, a critical press and
an informed public provide the equilibrium and introspective criticism
which form the basis of our great strength in dealing in an adversary
context.
A special problem posed by the expansion of East-West trade is the
extent to which the U.S. government may intrude into the private sec-
tor. This problem becomes especially acute as our businesses compete
or negotiate with the often disparate economic power of the state con-
trolled corporate monopolies of the Eastern countries, whose govern-
ments often play a key role in assisting their enterprises to win con-
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tracts. It is in such situations that our government might appropriately
assist American companies.
Three governmental organizations have been established to assist
American enterprises in the competition for East-West trade. The Joint
U.S.-U.S.S.R. Commercial Commission communicates daily in gov-
ernment to government exchanges. The Commerce Department con-
ducts an active assistance and coordination program with the private
sector although it does not participate in actual negotiation. Finally, the
Commerce Department's Bureau of East-West Trade Policy formulates
general government policy. The fact that the rules of the game have
changed makes it necessary that government play an active, more ag-
gressive role although he exact nature of that role remains uncertain.
REMARKS OF DR. JACOBus T. SEVERIENS
World trade has taken a broader meaning than simple import-export
relations. The complexity of trade and the different legal systems in-
volved require that standards be established, possibly in the form of a
code of behavior, applicable to all nations concerned with trade and
covering matters that have heretofore been dealt with on a bilateral
basis.
In its consideration of trade reform the Congress should review all
trade legislation including the Johnson Act. Further, the Webb-
Pomerene Act could be extended to import organizations so that im-
porters could trade with socialist countries on a unified basis.
SECOND SESSION, MODERATED BY PROFESSOR DEAN RUSK*
SOVIET-AMERICAN TRADE
Evgeniy V. Bugrov**
Andrzej B. Burzynski***
Gabriel M. Wilnert
REMARKS OF MR. EVGENIY V. BUGROV
The agreement signed by President Nixon and Premier Brezhnev
during Mr. Nixon's visit to the Soviet Union in May 1972, stands as a
good and encouraging example of how to succeed in international busi-
ness.
*Samuel H. Sibley Professor of International Law, University of Georgia School of Law.
**Counselor for Economic Affairs, Embassy of the U.S.S.R., Washington, D.C.
* **Member, Polish Foreign Commerce Ministry; Acting Professor of Comparative Law, Univer-
sity of Florida School of Law.
tAssociate Professor, University of Georgia School of Law
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Two of the 12 basic principles of the agreement merit comment. Item
One states that the principle of peaceful coexistence is the basis for the
relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. This state-
ment marks a turning point in the relationship between our two coun-
tries and indicates that a significant start has been made in reshaping
Soviet-American relations. Item Seven states that our two countries
regard expansion of commercial and economic relations through appro-
priate agreements, including long-term contracts, as a necessary ele-
ment in the strengthening of bilateral relations. Negotiations have led
to agreements in the areas of lend-lease, reciprocal aid and claims,
reciprocal credit arrangements, and commercial maritime relations.
Additionally, a joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. Commercial Commission has been
established. It must be emphasized that negotiations on these agree-
ments were greatly assisted by the realistic approach of both sides.
By the terms of the trade agreement both countries agree to grant to
the other most-favored-nation treatment in customs, duties, and formal-
ities related to import and export. Further, the agreement provides that
each country will seek to encourage the establishment of effective busi-
ness links between Soviet and American companies taking into account
the resources and long-term requirements of each country in raw mate-
rials, equipment, and technology. The agreement provides for the possi-
bility of limiting the import of "sensitive" items. The Soviet Union does
not intend to ship goods to the United States that would disrupt the
American internal market. Both the United States and Soviet Union
will establish commercial offices in the capital city of the other country.
Also, an international trade center will soon be constructed in Moscow
to satisfy the business needs of foreign companies.
The trade agreement is most significant in view of the total lack of
business contacts between our two countries. If the legislative bodies of
the United States and Soviet Union approve the trade agreement, there
is no reason that the goal of increasing Soviet-American trade to triple
the 1969-71 level during a three year period cannot be reached.
The granting of most-favored-nation status to the Soviet Union by
the United States cannot be considered as an act of economic assistance.
The absence of trade over the past quarter century has been costly to
both countries. Those who describe resumption of trade relations be-
tween our countries in terms of benefit to the Soviets and loss to the
Americans forget the lessons of history and misrepresent the agreement
between our governments.
It should be noted that Soviet trade reached $35 billion during 1972
and an increasing volume of trade was transacted with western countries
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and Japan. Last year Soviet trade with capitalist countries totaled $8
billion, a figure three times greater than in 1962. At present, Soviet
trade with 90 countries is being conducted on the basis of most-favored-
nation treatment. My understanding is that none of these 90 nations
regard themselves as providing economic assistance to the Soviet
Union.
The policy of no trade with the Soviet Union has failed to slow the
industrial growth of the Soviet Union. Soviet industrial output is cur-
rently 14 times the 1940 level. The "no trade" policy has stimulated the
Soviet search for new trading partners. For example, trade between
Japan and the Soviet Union reached $1.1 billion in 1972, and a 1971
Soviet-Japanese trade payments agreement contemplates a further in-
crease in total trade volume. Methods of cooperaton regarding the con-
struction of a Siberian oil pipeline and exploration of coal deposits and
off-shore oil and gas fields are under discussion with Japanese firms.
Soviet trade with the Federal Republic of Germany reached $1 billion
in 1972, a 50 percent increase from 1970. Under a June 1972 agreement
the Soviet Union will deliver natural gas to West Germany in exchange
for metal parts. The agreement further contemplates transactions in
chemicals, furniture, and other industries. Also, economic trade and
cooperation withFrance has increased in recent years, and under present
agreements the trend will continue.
Even without normalized trade relations, the industrial output of the
Soviet Union is more than 75 percent of that of the United States. The
Soviet Union now produces more steel than the United States. The
Soviet economy will continue to press no matter what happens to
Soviet-American trade.
I would like to underline the fact that the Soviet Union is not inter-
ested in trade with the United States more than the United States is
interested in trade with the Soviet Union. With this understanding in
mind we can view trade as a kind of cooperation rather than an exercise
in counting possible mutual gains.
By all standards our economies complement each other, and we are,
therefore, not competitors. In this respect Soviet-American trade could
favorably influence the United States balance of trade. However, with-
out most-favored-nation status our two nations will remain potential
rather than actual trading partners. The most-favored-nation treatment
is an internationally recognized condition for the development of trade
and would serve to rectify the present discrimination against the Soviet
Union in the field of trade. The improvement in political relations has
served as an incentive to the development of improved economic rela-
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tions. The improved economic relations will produce further political
improvements and a civilizing effect on Soviet-American political rela-
tions. Those who trade and participate in joint economic ventures are
not expected to think in terms of cold war. It is that simple, and it is a
lesson for the future.
The whole business of Soviet-American trade requires a realistic ap-
proach. The Soviet Union believes there are economic benefits and
possibilities for both the United States and the Soviet Union in develop-
ing long-term and large-scale economic cooperation. The Soviet Union
enjoys an abundance of those natural resources which the United States
lacks or has in short supply. Such resources could become available
through a variety of mutually beneficial approaches.
It must be emphasized that the Moscow agreement specified that the
bilateral development of normal relations should be based on noninter-
ference in internal affairs. The Soviet Union suggests no changes in
American domestic affairs as a precondition to trade and expects the
American side to reciprocate with regard to internal Soviet policies,
including emigration regulations. Applicatons of Soviet citizens wishing
to leave the country for permanent residence abroad are considered on
an individual basis. Generally, these applications are granted. For ex-
ample, over 95 percent of those who applied to emigrate to Israel in
1972 received permission to leave. It may be noted that more than 2,000
persons who received permission to leave for Israel in 1972 did not in
fact make use of that permission. The decree of the Presidium of the
Supreme Soviet of August 3, 1972 provides that Soviet citizens who
receive permission to emigrate can be exempted fully from refunding
state education expenses. Consequently, only such normal and insignifi-
cant duties which were also collected before August 3, 1972, are being
collected and will be collected from those leaving the Soviet Union for
permanent residence in other countries. No time limitations have been
put on the effect of this decree. As is true in other states, Soviet citizens
may be denied permission to go abroad for reasons of national security.
Attempts to tie the granting of most-favored-nation status to changes
in Soviet internal regulations are seen by the Soviet Union as efforts to
thwart trade between our countries. The Soviet Union and United
States belong to different social and economic systems and an approach
of noninterference in internal affairs is imperative. You may be assured
that the Soviet Union with its good will is prepared to meet the United
States halfway in a joint venture called Soviet-American trade, a ven-
ture based on full equality and mutual benefit.
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REMARKS OF DR. ANDRZEJ BURZYNSKI
A few years ago lawyers were suddenly faced by what appeared to
be a new idea, namely cooperation among countries in the various stages
of the manufacturing and marketing process. In time lawyers found that
from a legal point of view the problems arising from such economic
cooperation could be dealt with through the traditional contract of sale
and contract of licensing. However, economic cooperation in the form
of direct investment is excitingly different because it invokes the distinc-
tion between legal systems governing countries of different social sys-
tems.
There are a number of barriers for western firms that desire to create
joint ventures that would operate in socialist countries. A psychological
barrier has been created by unfavorable pre-World War II foreign in-
vestments, the socialist concept of revolution under the slogan of liberat-
ing workers from foreign capitalist oppression, and 20 years of socialist
thinking which rebuffed all capitalistic ideas. This psychological barrier
has been somewhat broken, however, by the fact the socialist countries
are now strong enough to negotiate participation of western capital in
their countries on a more equal basis. Western firms still hesitate,
though, to immerse their capital into economic systems whichare cen-
trally planned and operate under rigid price controls.
There are also a number of legal obstacles in socialist countries to the
input of western capital. For example, how would the property of a joint
venture in a socialist nation be classified? What type of legal entity
would a joint venture be in a country which recognizes only public or
state-owned enterprises as legal persons? What are the workers' rights
in such ventures? How can such joint venture companies deal directly
with foreign companies?
Socialist countries have taken a twofold approach to these problems.
Yugoslavia, Rumania, and Hungary, for example, have provided legis-
lative guidelines. Generally, such legislation is recent in origin and
rather broad in scope, permitting the parties wide negotiating authority.
The other approach taken by Poland, however, rejects legislation and
prefers experience on a case-by-case basis. The multifaceted problems
that restrict western trade with socialist countries show that lawyers on
both sides have an enormous task ahead of them in creating legal foun-
dations for future economic cooperation.
REMARKS OF PROF. GABRIEL WILNER
It should be noted that Soviet-American trade relations have come a
long way since the decision not to trade at the close of World War II.
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Contrary to the desires and forecasts of both countries, neither the
American nor the socialist economies collapsed during the nontrading
period.
Although we can applaud what the United States and Soviet Union
have done bilaterally, there is responsibility on the part of both East and
West to shape an economic system which will take into account the
needs of all peoples, including those of the developing world. Perhaps
we ought to think of going further and, in helping ourselves, help the
rest of the world that needs our help so badly.
DISCUSSION OF AUDIENCE QUESTIONS
QUESTION: Will not trading our technology for Soviet goods and re-
sources be detrimental to American security?
MR. CASEY: In terms of American economic security, it depends upon
the items of technology exchanged and the terms of the transaction.
Proper payments over an extended period of time may enhance our
financial position. In terms of military security, the United States will
continue to protect its position.
MR. BUGROV: The Soviet Union has reached parity with the United
States in strategic weapons. The Soviet government realizes certain
problems are posed.
QUESTION: Which items would the Soviet Union wish to obtain from
the United States?
MR. BUGROV: The Soviet Union is interested in buying both consumer
goods and industrial items, and in selling technology.
QUESTION: What changes in prices and restrictions would be caused by
granting the Soviet Union most-favored-nation status?
MR. LAZARUS: Most-favored-nation status refers to a two column tariff
system, one column based on the 1930 tariff system, and the other on a
more liberal system consistent with GATT agreements. There are very
few countries of the world to whom the United States does not extend
most-favored-nation status. Although such status would positively af-
fect such traditionally traded goods as vodka or nickel, it would also
make a significant difference in the possibility for trade in new goods.
Also, placing the two countries in a position of equity would establish
a firm foundation for the growth of future trade.
QUESTION: Why should Soviet internal affairs have any bearing on the
decision of the United States to trade with the Soviet Union?
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MR. LANDRUM: The United States has a psychological barrier to over-
come here. The Trade Reform Act of 1973 which seeks to give the
President authority to negotiate terms of mutual and beneficial interest
must travel the route of 435 members of Congress and 100 members of
the Senate with their extremely diverse opinions. Generally, as long as
the Soviet Union and United States remain within their fundamental
orbits and concepts of what they want for their people, there is no reason
why we cannot develop a satisfactory trade relationship without inter-
ference by either in the other's internal affairs.
QUESTION: Why did 2,000 individuals granted emigration permits by the
Soviet government refuse to emigrate during 1972?
MR. BUGROV: I am sure the reasons are quite diverse. One of the
reasons may be that hundreds of people who emigrated to Israel now
wish to return to the Soviet Union.
QUESTION: Was the temporary allowance of increased emigration a
concession to meet the United States halfway?
MR. BUGROV: I do not believe the change in emigration was a conces-
sion. The change was prompted by the desire not to create difficulties
for those who wish to emigrate. The change is a standing policy which
will remain unchanged.
MR. WILNER: As I commented earlier, in multilateral relations eco-
nomic advantages or economic relations are sometimes used for unre-
lated purposes. For example, the United Nations Security Council has
used economic sanctions in dealing with non-economic questions. I see
nothing in the large picture that is inconsistent with putting forth differ-
ent points of view and hoping to get better conditions, economic or
otherwise.
QUESTION: In view of the lack of representation of the "third world" at
this conference, is it true that in seeking economic unity the large eco-
nomic powers are perpetuating the unified and systematic repression of
third world countries, particularly the African nations?
MR. CASEY: Certainly not. Both countries have developed programs of
assistance and contribute to the World Bank and other multilateral
institutims which promote the development of third world countries.
The process of creating and fostering East-West trade must be carried
on within the global economic system which must serve the mutual
interest of all countries.
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MR. BUGROV: The Soviet Union is not prepared to do anything detri-
mental to African nations, in developing economic relations with the
United States, and the Americans have never suggested that we do so.
QUESTION: In what capacity did Secretary Brezhnev sign the U.S.-
U.S.S.R. Trade Agreement?
MR. BUGROV: In a capacity corresponding to President Nixon.
QUESTION: Which southeastern ports will be open to the Soviet Union
under the Maritime Agreement?
MR. LAZARUS: Savannah. Also, Tampa, Baton Rouge and New Orleans
on the Gulf.
QUESTION: Would the Soviet Union consider joining international or-
ganizations such as the International Monetary Fund or GATT?
MR. BUGROV: There are no immediate plans of the type; however, it is
a future possibility.
QUESTION: If the Soviet Union has ceased collecting exit fees, what is
considered the greatest obstacle to granting most favored nation status
to the Soviet Union?
MR. LANDRUM: The road is littered with obstacles but the largest obsta-
cle is convincing the American public that the government is not giving
away its technology, scientific accomplishments or strategic advantages
in developing trade. Thus an important part of the trade problem is
educational.
MR. BUGROV: In view of the Congressman's statement, it should be
noted that article 8 of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Trade Agreement reads as
follows: "The provisions of this agreement shall not limit the right of
either government to take any action for the protection of its security
interests."
QUESTION: Has the Soviet Union ever made demands concerning the
internal affairs of the United States?
MR. WILNER: I am unaware of any specific demand in open negotia-
tions.
MR. BUGROV: I have never heard of a single case when the Soviet Union
requested any changes in the American internal affairs as a precondition
for any negotiation.
MR. LAZARUS: It should be noted that the United States government
has made no demand on the Soviet Union with regard to emigration
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policy. The Congress, as an independent institution of government, has
pending before it an amendment cosigned by a number of its members
which includes a conditional authorization to the President to extend
most favored nation status, which condition is based on the Soviet
emigration policy. Yet no government institution has made a demand,
and this problem is entirely within the context of our legislative process.
QUESTION: Is the recent wheat sale by the United States to the Soviet
Union indicative of future "mutually advantageous" trade agreements?
MR. BUGROV: The wheat was purchased with hard currency. If the deal
was disadvantageous to the United States, it could have been refused.
As to the future, if trade barriers were removed, the Soviet Union would
buy American grain on a more or less permanent basis in return for
Soviet goods.
MR. LANDRUM: It must be said that they bought better than we sold.
QUESTION: Will the Soviet government permit equity participation in
joint ventures within the Soviet Union?
MR. BUGROV: Currently the Soviet Union has no legislation allowing
equity participation of American corporations and finds such legislation
unnecessary. The Soviet Union is prepared to accept credits in order to
develop certain types of industry and to repay the credits with interest.
It is a question of form of return rather than substance. Up to now the
western companies have accepted profits in the form of interest rather
than dividends without complaint. The joint ownership question is not
a bone of contention in Soviet-American relations.
QUESTION: What are the major items the United States will purchase
from the Soviet Union?
MR. CASEY: There is no limitation on what the United States may buy.
Currently the United States is most interested in raw materials, gas and
minerals. As our trading relationship develops and as the usual technol-
ogies of manufacturers increase, more consumer items and manufac-
tured goods will be traded. For example, the Soviet Union has a supe-
rior skill in medical instruments and hospital supplies.
MR. BUGROV: The list could be expanded. The Soviet Union is prepared
to sell planes and any items which are commercially acceptable to
American business.
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REMARKS OF THE LUNCHEON SPEAKER, MR. PETER M.
FLANIGAN*
During the President's first term in office several developments oc-
curred which bear directly on the establishment of international peace
and stability. Among the President's major accomplishments in this
area are the conclusion of the Vietnam war, the opening of the door to
mainland China, piercing the walls of the Kremlin, and laying the foun-
dation for restructuring the international monetary and economic sys-
tem. Present negotiations continue in the SALT talks and in the Euro-
pean Security Conference concerning a mutual and balanced reduction
of forces in Europe.
But no structure of peace can be strong unless it encompasses interna-
tional economic affairs.
The present international economic system had its beginning at Bret-
ton Woods at the end of World War II at a time when the United States
had all the chips, was willing to give and asked for little. Our goal then
was to develop a stable free world which meant that other nations had
to be strong.
Today, these goals have been reached but the Bretton Woods system
no longer serves us so well. Our aid programs came to represent a steady
drain on our economy, and the dollar, battered by inflation and a gener-
ation of deficit in our balance of payments, is no longer a pillar of world
strength. In 1972 our balance of payments deficit was over $9 billion,
and from 1970 to 1972 our imports expanded 40 percent while exports
went up only 15 percent.
As a result, and to hasten stability at home, the President intensified
the battle against inflation, surcharged imports, barred trading in gold,
and obtained new parities for the dollar.
Last fall at the World Bank Meeting, the President said: "We are
secure enough in our independence to freely assert our interdependance.
We shall press for a more equitable and a more open world trade. We
shall not turn inward in isolationism and in turn we shall look to our
friends for evidence of a similar rejection of isolationism in economic
and political affairs."
Progress is being made on the monetary front. We are presently
working with the "Group of Twenty" and are taking an integrated
approach to the problems of short term capital flows, trade figures,
monetary values, and foreign investment.
*Assistant to the President for International Economic Affairs.
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Where we have to make progress now is on the trade front.
The last decade saw some progress in this field with the implementa-
tion of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 and the Kennedy Round of
trade negotiations. But at that time we had a substantial trade surplus
and not too much attention was paid to such inequities as unfair barriers
to our agricultural exports.
To provide for needed reform, as well as for expansion, the President
has submitted the Trade Reform Act of 1973, which seeks to achieve
five major purposes.
First, it would enable the government to join in negotiating a more
open world of trade. The act would give the President the power to
negotiate changes in non-tariff barriers and authorize him over a five
year period to either raise or reduce tariffs as a part of a negotiated
trade package.
Second, it would enable the government to seek a more equitable
trading world where our goods can compete fairly with those of other
countries. To this end the President would be authorized to retaliate
against unfair or illegal barriers to our products abroad. It would also
streamline authority to deal with dumping and with the subsidization
of exports by other countries, and it would put patent infringement by
imported goods on the same basis as domestic goods.
Third, the act would ease the adjustment process our workers face
by virtue of a sudden flood of imports from abroad. Unemployment
caused by imports would be dealt with in the same manner as unemploy-
ment from other causes. A new system of unemployment insurance and
pension reform has been proposed to help in the adjustment.
Fourth, the President would be empowered to temporarily raise or
reduce tariffs as a means of last resort to meet imbalances which occur
by virtue of another country having a persistent balance of payments
surplus or deficit. This power could also be used to fight inflation by
increasing the supply of goods under significant price pressures. This
would, of course, call for adjustments to the provisions of our GATT
agreements.
Fifth, the act would enable the President to grant preferences to
developing countries.
That portion of the act which would empower the President to grant
most favored nation status to communist countries subject to congres-
sional approval has proven to be the most controversial aspect of the
act due to the Soviet emigration policies. But as those policies have
become liberalized, opposition should decrease.
Companion legislation would also allow exporters to join in the
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bidding process without violating the anti-trust laws.
The Trade Reform Act will provide us the equal negotiating powers
we need in negotiating with equals. It does not represent a power grab
on the part of the President, but rather embodies a logical extension of
powers that have been granted to presidents in the past to reflect chang-
ing international economic realities.
For example, through the 1930's, especially with the enactment of
Hawley-Smoot, the Congress exercised directly its Constitutional man-
date to lay and collect duties and to regulate commerce with foreign
nations. But the experience of those years proved the necessity of dele-
gating to the executive under broad guidelines the authority to set tariffs
and to negotiate. Every trade bill since 1930 has recognized this impera-
tive and has increased the power of the President to negotiate on tariffs.
The present act contains no unprecedented departures, and provides
only for improvements, especially the ability to act more promptly. The
only exemption involves the generalized preferences to developing coun-
tries, but this is an authority the President has been requesting for years.
The Trade Reform Act will give the President the capacity to meet
the challenges posed by the magnitude and pace of economic change
which confronts us today.
DISCUSSION OF AUDIENCE QUESTIONS
QUESTION: What is the significance of the granting of most favored
nation treatment to the Soviet Union within the context of the Trade
Reform Act?
MR. FLANIGAN: The act recognizes that the granting of MFN status to
the Soviet Union is one of the conditions contained in the three year
Soviet-American trade agreement recently concluded. If the trade
agreement is not extended under its terms upon its expiration, then we
can reconsider all the connected rights, including MFN.
QUESTION: What would happen to our workers displaced by tariff re-
ductions if Congress does not approve the actions of the President that
lead to their displacement and if Congress does not approve the unem-
ployment insurance or pension reforms that are being proposed?
MR. FLANIGAN: The Trade Act would place such workers in the same
position as workers who are displaced for some other reason such as
some new environmental policy. He will not be treated differently as he
has been in the past. The President can, though, restrain imports for up
to five years. These workers still have the benefit of the job retraining
funds, job search funds, and relocation grants that are available to all
displaced workers.
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QUESTION: How will the trading negotiations be conducted under these
new measures?
MR. FLANIGAN: The Administration intends to seek congressional ap-
proval to combine the functions of the White House Special Trade
Representative, who has a negotiating function, with the Council on
International Economic Policy, which has a policy function. The Special
Trade Rpresentative, whose position was created by the 1962 Trade
Expansion Act, will be negotiating under the policy direction of the
Council on International Economic Policy.
QUESTION: How will the Trade Reform Act change the various retalia-
tory powers embodied in existing laws, and how can the President be
expected to use them?
MR. FLANIGAN: The Trade Expansion Act of 1962 empowered the Pres-
ident to retaliate primarily in the area of agricultural goods. The new
act would facilitate retaliation with respect to industrial goods. The new
act would also embrace the current anti-dumping and countervailing
duties laws. New means of retaliation would be authorized either by way
of tariff or non-tariff barriers, but the new law would not specify the
exact form of retaliation to be used in response to any specific act.
QUESTION: Is it dangerous for the United States to increasingly rely on
Middle East oil supplies considering the instability of governments in
that area?
MR. FLANIGAN: From 1959 until earlier this year we were bound by the
Mandatory Oil Program which put a quota system on imports of oil out
of national security concern for relying on outside sources of energy.
Clearly, however, we have not been able to develop domestic sources of
energy, and until we do so, we will have to rely increasingly on sources
from abroad. We recognize the instability of the Middle East govern-
ments, but we are looking to other sources from North Africa, Indone-
sia, Venezuela, and hopefully, the Soviet Union.
QUESTION: Would the granting of generalized preferences to the devel-
oping countries be confined to industrial and high technology goods?
MR. FLANIGAN: A major goal of the negotiations is to spread tariff
reductions and non-tariff barrier reductions across the board to include
also agricultural products and semi-manufactured goods.
QUESTION: What safeguards against abuse are contained in the compan-
ion legislation which would allow groups of exporters to join in bidding
on major proposals from abroad without violating the anti-trust laws?
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MR. FLANIGAN: The suggested changes in the Webb-Pomerene Act are
very limited and are directed to the ability of an association of bidders
to bid for major foreign products. The changes would not grant a power
to allocate markets between competitors.
QUESTION: If the retaliatory powers are granted, could or would they
be used for political reasons?
MR. FLANIGAN: It would be nice in this uncertain world to be able to
answer that question with certitude, but rest assured that it will always
be charged at some point that they are being used for political reasons.
THIRD SESSION, MODERATED BY MR. BENJAMIN BUSCH*
SINO-AMERICAN TRADE
Victor Hoa Li**
Graham Metson**
Donald Clarkf
Reg Murphytt
REMARKS OF DR. VICTOR HOA Li
The current attention of the American public to trade with China is
in part due to the fact that trade reflects the symbolic and dramatic shift
in relations between the United States and China. Ping-pong.was the
ice breakers but trade is one of the principal means by which the shift
will be implemented. We should keep in mind that just as trade replaced
ping-pong, something else can replace trade.
Before exploring the prospects of trade with China, it is important to
examine the reasons that trade is desirable to Americans. There is a
long-standing myth about the China market to the effect that there are
hundreds of millions of consumers in China waiting to purchase western
products and in return wish to sell raw materials and agricultural prod-
ucts. Foreign companies have often erroneously regarded the large
Chinese population as a "volume market" for their products.
But in determining the future volume of Sino-American trade, one
must look at existing trade patterns. The total volume of China's two-
way trade is not large, amounting to about 4 to 5 billion dollars yearly
*Chairman, American Bar Association Section on International Law.
**Associate Professor, Stanford Law School.
* **Economic Officer for Mainland China, U.S. Department of State.
tPartner in the firm of McClain, Mellen, Bowling & Hickman, Atlanta, Georgia.
ttEditor, The Constitution, Atlanta, Georgia.
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or about $7 per person. In contrast, the United States conducts an
annual two-way trade of 80 to 90 billion dollars, or about $400 per
person. Total Chinese trade is likely to increase in the future, but the
increase will be slow and geared to the increase in the size of the Chinese
economy. If China becomes more willing to take long-term credits,
trade may increase more rapidly. The push toward industrialization
may increase the need for western technology, but it will probably not
dramatically increase trade volume. There may even be a cutback in
trade if China is serious about its policy of self-reliance and emphasis
on agriculture.
Present Chinese trade statistics show that approximately 75 percent
of Chinese exports is in foodstuffs, animal products and textiles. There
is little American demand for their products except in the form of
specialty or novelty items. Metals and minerals compose 15 percent of
Chinese exports, and this area may grow in attraction for American
traders. The remainder of China's exports is in specialities such as rugs,
dishes and jade carvings, and a large number of such "doodads" and
"knicknacks" must be sold to get a good return. Generally, this trade
pattern shows that sales to the United States will be limited and consis-
tent with Chinese sales to Japan and to the industrialized countries of
Europe.
Chinese purchases from the United States have largely been in miner-
als, chemicals, metals, and machinery and equipment. Although the
United States has much to sell in these areas, trade is complicated by
the trade restrictions placed on the very high technology items in which
the United States enjoys a direct competitive advantage. In other items
of trade the United States faces stiff competition from West Germany
and Japan. Furthermore, the Chinese will not disrupt their established
trade relationships just to give the United States a substantial share.
It would appear that in 1973 Sino-American trade will reach $200 to
$300 million, well above the $100 million of 1972. Although American
trade with China has grown faster than expected, it should soon level
off in the $400 million to $500 million per year range. This figure would
increase greatly if off-shore petroleum reserves are developed. To put
this trade in perspective, bilateral trade at a level of one half billion
dollars would only be one half of one percent of the American total.
However, Americans should not view the lack of trade as the result of
Chinese obstructionism.
One should view trade as a part of a society's overall activity and
realize that it reflects the same concerns and attitudes that affect the
society's actions in other areas. This is especially true of China with a
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strong, centralized, bureaucratic control of trade. As an example,
Chinese trade contracts usually contain a clause that in its worst form
states, "a dispute will be solved amicably but if this is not possible, the
case will be submitted to a Chinese tribunal sitting in Peking for arbitra-
tion." However, the arbitration clause is invoked very rarely and ap-
pears only to be a method of ousting the jurisdiction of foreign courts.
In case of dispute the first part of the clause becomes operative, and the
Chinese tend to reject suggestions of arbitration before the Peking
panel.
The Chinese enter into relations with a foreign trader very slowly.
Early trading is carried on in small, often disappointing sums. After
traders decide they are happy with each other the amount of trade
increases rapidly. Perhaps the same attitude applies to other rela-
tions-a slow careful groping until a point of good faith is established
and a friendly atmosphere develops.
Clearly, trade decisions involve a mix of political and economic con-
siderations. It is interesting to note that the Chinese put more political
considerations into trade than is customary in the United States and
apply different political considerations to different situations. The
Chinese use of political leverage is shown by China's relations with its
largest trading partner, Japan, and with its largest European trading
partner, West Germany. Japanese businesses must become "friendly
firms" and are subjected to a full range of political principles and condi-
tions. In this manner China has been successful in influencing Japanese
policy toward China. However, German businessmen have not been
subjected to the imposition of such political conditions. For example,
during early German trade negotiations with China the United States
put pressure on the.German government not to include a certain amount
of state recognition of China in exchange for a Chinese admission that
West Berlin was a part of West Germany. When Chancellor Erhardt
and President Johnson issued a statement that there would be no recog-
nition in the trade agreement the Chinese said little. Later, when Ameri-
can pressure forced the cancellation of negotiations for a $70 million
steel mill to be financed by credit guaranteed by the German import-
export government agency, there was no visible angry response from the
Chinese. But a similar incident relating to the purchase of a vinyl plant
on credit from the Japanese caused a major furor.
Perhaps the difference in the Chinese response can be explained by
the proximity of Japan and the cultural and historical affinity between
the two countries. In any event, China felt it could influence Japanese
policies but not those of West Germany. It is probable that the United
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States fits on the spectrum somewhere between West Germany and
Japan. As political relations between China and United States change,
so will the economic strategies of the two countries and the fortunes of
Sino-American trade.
REMARKS BY MR. GRAHAM METSON
Although the political implications of trade are quite significant, both
sides feel that trade could be economically advantageous.
Political relations between China and the United States have im-
proved enormously, as evidenced by the opening of the Washington and
Peking liason offices which will provide the two countries the opportun-
ity to maintain direct, face-to-face contact. Also, the National Council
for U.S.-China Trade, a unique organization of high-level business-
men, will soon be organized. Its goal is to increase understanding be-
tween China and the United States and to inform American business-
men of Chinese business practices and prospects.
An important and difficult question is whether the Chinese will in-
crease the orientation of their economy toward foreign trade. The
Chinese have broken with their previous practice of transacting exclu-
sively on a cash basis and have made several medium term credit pur-
chases. Japan and Great Britain are exploring the possibility of further
credit sales. In this regard it should be noted that in undertaking a new
process the Chinese are very thorough and often investigate the same
ground several times.
Although the Chinese now appear to be interested in credit from the
private sector, there are a number of problems regarding American
credit. The most pressing problem is the settlement of private American
claims. Until these claims of more than $196 million are settled, Chinese
ships or commodities entering United States jurisdiction are subject to
seizure by the Claimants. Such claims prohibit the possibility of a
Chinese trade fair in the United States and entry of Chinese ships into
American ports. The Chinese are often forced, therefore, to transact
with us indirectly through third parties.
Another obstacle to trade stems from 1950 when the United States
blocked all Chinese assets located in the United States. As a result, the
Chinese refuse to transact directly with American banks. An agreement
in principle on this question has been reached and further negotiations
are underway.
The Chinese view the lack of most favored nation treatment as an
impediment to trade and an affront to Chinese national pride. Discus-
sions on this point are necessary. A host of minor problems, such as
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copyright agreements, shipping lines and direct air traffic between
China and the United States, must be discussed before trade can become
normalized.
REMARKS OF MR. DONALD 0. CLARK
Americans are often guilty of "projectionism", or attributing to for-
eigners the same characteristics that we possess as Americans. This is
a serious problem in international trade. Americans must realize that
the Chinese people are quite different from Americans. The oriental
culture, including both China and Japan, emphasizes mediation, concili-
ation and accomodation. The accomodating nature of the oriental busi-
nessman may frustrate the demanding, impatient nature of the Ameri-
can businessman who may consider such acts to be sneaky. Misunder-
standings are increased because Americans have traditionally neglected
study of oriental society and institutions, concentrating on Europe in-
stead.
There are some constants that provide guideposts in international
trade. Unlike the free-for-all capitalistic system, the Chinese economy
is controlled both internally and externally. Each year the Ministry of
Trade and the Peoples Bank of China collaborate on a central plan.
Such planning gives the government great flexibility in its trade pro-
gram. Businessmen can expect the Chinese government to import items
in short supply and to export those products it has in surplus. This
means that China will be acquiring highly sophisticated items and basic
goods which are not produced or available in the country. Also, the
government can be expected to engage in trade to acquire foreign ex-
change. Viewing trade with China in these terms gives a businessman
an indication of the success he will have in trade with China.
The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Trade has seven foreign trade corpo-
rations under its control. Each trade corporation is responsible for its
area of expertise. The Chinese have shown a penchant for F.O.B. sales
on imports and C.I.F. sales on exports. This gives the Chinese the
opportunity to control shipping and utilize Chinese insurance compa-
nies. Although foreign businessmen view China's shipping practice with
concern, in reality it has not proven to be a serious obstacle to trade.
The reason so few cases reach arbitration before the Commission for
Promotion of Foreign Trade in Peking stems from the basic oriental
idea that litigants should be able to settle the dispute themselves. Also,
practicalities often dictate reluctance on the part of foreign businessmen
to subject themselves to the unknown statutes and processes of a foreign
court. However, the developing practice of American businessmen to
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rely on legal processes to settle disputes may represent an obstacle to
the settlement of differences with Chinese firms, especially since the
Chinese trade officer is a government official with standards to meet.
Generally, it is considered best to reach agreement on the problem in
dispute and attempt to recoup losses on later contracts with assistance
of the Chinese official. Obviously, there is some risk in this approach.
In China agreements must be in writing. Contracts are usually stand-
ardized and weighted toward performance in contrast to American con-
tracts which are usually breach-oriented.
It should be noted that companies trading with the Chinese have
encountered unexplained delays in getting the actual trade underway,
and the United States has created some interesting situatons in this
regard. For example, we sold China an RCA satellite station which
contained items on the COCOM list and then had to go to COCOM to
ask for permission to sell the equipment. The situation proved to be
highly embarrassing to us.
In closing it would be wise to note a statement by Chairman Mao,
"We should unite with their people [the United States] and strive to co-
exist peacefully, do business with them and prevent any possible war,
but under no circumstances should we harbor any unrealistic notions
about them."
REMARKS BY MR. REG MURPHY
Despite the somewhat guarded forecasts of the earlier speakers, the
next few years will likely bring a large expansion of Chinese-American
trade. For example, Lockheed is negotiating the sale of Hercules air-
craft. Also, American business has the capability to make large sales
of services to the Chinese. China has made the internal commitment to
industrialize, and this will create a'demand for services which does not
currently exist in China.
The Chinese committment to trade is evidenced by the fact that,
contrary to previous practice, they are considering the process of going
into debt. Also, they are now seeking to acquire foreign exchange by
establishing industries that produce export items.
The Chinese have not yet made a decision regarding tourism. Al-
though tourism is an excellent source of foreign currency, the Chinese
are hesitant to open their doors to foreign influences which they consider
corruptive. Without tourism trade becomes more important.
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FOURTH SESSION, MODERATED BY MR. CHARLES HODGKINS*
PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES OF
TRANSACTIONS WITH STATE CONTROLLED
ECONOMIES
C.C. (Kees) van den Heuvel**
Jeremy Russell* **
David Wintert
REMARKS OF MR. VAN DEN HEUVEL
The question of trade cannot be separated from the political, cultural,
or psychological aspects of East-West relations. The communist concept
of peaceful coexistence must be taken into account as part of a realistic
approach to trading relationships. The concept embraces not only coop-
eration, as Mr. Bugrov pointed out, but competition and struggle be-
tween systems as well. And, of course, ideological coexistence is not
possible.
With these realities in mind, the goals of each side in East-West trade
must be examined. The communist literature regarding economic rela-
tions shows that peaceful coexistence is a part of the overall political
program. The East European countries are very keen to take advantage
of western know-how and industrial expertise to speed the pace of their
industrial development. They are trying to build consumer societies, and
although they will buy consumer goods from the West, they are much
more interested in buying the means to produce consumer goods. As for
the Soviets, in some areas of technology, like defense and space, they
are very well advanced, but in other areas, like capital industry, the
petro-chemical industry and computers, they are far behind.
The West seeks not only economic gain, but also the opportunity to
expose the East to western ideas in an effort to encourage certain pro-
cesses in that part of the world.
East-West trade is currently more important for the East than for the
West because the East is still weaker economically. In the long run the
competitive situation in Western countries may require new markets,
*General Counsel, Coca Cola Export Corp., Atlanta, Georgia.
**Director, The Internatonal Documentation Center,'The Hague, Netherlands.
* **Shell International Petroleum Corp., London, England.
tPartner in the firm of Baker & McKenzie, London, England.
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and this situation may lead to quite objective gains for western compa-
nies.
The West is particularly concerned, however, with restrictions im-
posed in. the East on the free flow of information, persons and ideas.
These restrictions currently represent an obstacle to any further im-
provement in trade and relations between the two sides.
Another obstacle to East-West trade is the concern on both sides that
they not become too dependent on each other. The Soviet Union ac-
knowledges the need to raise its technology by dealing with the capitalist
world but is concerned with retaining unity within the East European
Bloc as well as maintaining its own self-sufficiency. There is much
concern in Western Europe that the large import of Soviet raw materials
will give the Soviet government an effective hold over the economy of
Western Europe. Further, if the United States solves its natural gas
shortage with imports from the Soviet Union, a position of increasing
dependence would be created.
The improvement in relations between East and West might begin by
each side making an effort to know more about the other. A better
understanding will enable each party to examine its position from a
more correct perspective. Recent years have seen an increased flow of
objective information between East and West, and this provides each
side a better view of trade opportunities and helps to remove erroneous
images and misunderstandings.
REMARKS OF MR. JEREMY RUSSELL
I want to start by very briefly going over some of the basic steps which
would be fundamental in understanding relations with Eastern Europe.
Firstly, one must understand what the possibilities of trade really are.
How do you find out? Consult the annual and find the plans of the
country. Consult the survey of trade. Consult your commercial press in
Moscow. Consult some of the mass publications available from official
and semi-official bodies, chambers of commerce, and after that have a
look at what your competitors are doing.
Secondly, one must decide whether one's own particular line or com-
modity has a future in the Soviet market, or if the Soviet Union is likely
to have commodites to export that would be of interest to you.
One criterion for your end product should be whether it is a
technological leader. Another might be if it could be easily demon-
strated as involving a significant saving in manpower or raw material
cost to the Soviet economy.
Thirdly, one must determine the correct procedure for contacting the
present organization in the USSR at the right level. Should the State
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Committee for Science and Technology be involved or an industry min-
ister or the Ministry of Foreign Trade? Should the president of your
company go to Moscow or the sales representative or chief technologist
or the public relations man or the whole lot or nobody at all? Again,
you must consult the experts.
And, first of all, one must familiarize himself with the invitation,
accommodations, travel and visa formalities.
Armed with an untiring sense of humor and the patience of Job, it is
at about this stage that one comes into contact with those elusive things
having to do with the practical difficulties or possible realities of trans-
actions with nations having state operated economies.
In the course of preparing this talk, I developed a list of these difficul-
ties about a yard and a half long. I began to mull over them, and I asked
myself whether the difficulties were really what we wanted to talk about;
or were they not something that one really talked himself into? If one
changes his conception of it, would not many of these difficulties be-
come merely differences? And then I asked myself whether these differ-
ences were such as to give rise in practice to any genuine clashes between
the basic systems operated by Russia and by my country. On looking
back on my experiences in East-West trade in the last nine or ten years,
I arrived at the answer, "No."
Now, understand we didn't come here to find fault with anybody in
this trading system, particularly with such a distinguished representative
from the USSR and such a distinguished gathering from the West.
There is no right or wrong party in all this, merely a familiar and
unfamiliar setup with, on the one hand, a bunch of guys trying to do
the best for themselves and their organization and their country and, on
the other hand, a bunch of guys trying to do the best for themselves,
for their organization and their country.
Indeed, there are differences in motivation, in the time scale used
from day to day in transactions, in the degree of bureaucracy, and in
the content and nature of communications in the information flow. This
can certainly give rise to difficulties if it is misunderstood, and I intend
to examine some of these differences and offer some suggestions for
reconciling them. And when I've done that, I would like to share with
you some of my experiences in commercial contact with the Russians
in the hope that by the time I finish, some of the difficulties will have
transformed themselves into something easier. I also hope that a more
mutual understanding would be generated, for, when all is said and
done, we have to get down to the serious business of cohabiting this
planet and efficiently mobilizing its resources through trade and other
means for all mankind. The problem is how to avoid any participant
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being forced into or slighted into a disadvantageous position.
The fact that the countries of Eastern Europe exercise complete con-
trol over all aspects of foreign trade means that, to a considerably
greater extent than in many other parts of the world, foreign trade is
employed to further the political and economic objectives of the govern-
ment. There is apparently a Western desire for trade for trade's sake,
and one gets the impression that trade with the Russians normally is
regarded as something of a necessary evil.
The availability of currency within COMECON will naturally give
rise to a situation where every purchaser from outside COMECON may
scrutinize very carefully to see whether a deal can be made inside CO-
MECON or whether the commodity cannot be acquired through barter.
Indeed, an end user who wants to have a Western product imported has
to justify the purchase not only to his ministry but also to GASPEC and
GASPAN, and this takes time.
Looking at the structure of the trading system between Eastern and
Western Europe, one finds in the West hundreds of thousands of inde-
pendent companies making their decisions about when to import and to
export, subject to relatively few government controls, such as a purchas-
ing embargo list. In the Soviet Union, however, trade is conducted
through a Ministry of ForeignTrade with 16 trading organizations, each
concerned with the import and export of specific groups of commodities,
and they act on behalf of their clients, who will be ministers, factories,
shippers, and so forth.
In some other COMECON countries there are autonomous industry
trusts which perform the same sort of function with foreign industries.
The Soviet Ministry of Foreign Trade, however, determines the overall
direction in which their trade shall go. And if it decides that 65 percent
of a COMECON country's trade shall be with other COMECON coun-
tries, that tends to be the result. The Ministry can also decide which
foreign countries should get the most trading attention, especially if this
will in some way assist long term goals or objectives.
Now, I'm not saying that the governments of some COMECON
countries don't also sometimes act in some other way, but they usually
do act in accordance with the ministry's objectives.
All that I have just said can result in some instabilities, particularly
during the early stages of one's trading relations in this field. If you want
to sell something to Eastern countries, but you really do not have
enough of the product, their technologists will say they need it. Then
you talk it over with the Ministry, but they say they can't get the money
to import it. You offer to buy something from them,but they do not
know whether this will be available. And if you go to the trading organi-
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zations, they will tell you not only that they do not have any calls for
your product but also that they are buying it from your competitors
elsewhere. Or you want to buy something from them which you know
they have a lot of, but they say they have none available for export. Next
week you find it all turning up in your neighboring country, which has
just concluded an agreement with the Soviets.
There is nothing particularly unethical or immoral about all of this.
It does, however, rate very high on the international policy.
The fact of the matter is that the operation of controlled foreign trade
by the state gives those companies a great deal of power; more, perhaps,
than many of their Western counterparts. Now, this is particularly so
regarding imports in COMECON, where the volumes of products to be
purchased are frequently so great that competition within the West
drives prices down well below normal levels. There are wider indications
of this in especially large scale international economic corporations. It
becomes clear that no single capitalist concern can or ought to handle
the necessary financial arrangements. International consortia may be
able to handle it, but governments are clearly going to have to be
increasingly involved. There are many cases being talked about right
now which involve provision by the capitalist forces of very large sums,
billions of dollars of trade to the Soviet Union for both machinery and
technology in the short term against the ultimate export of raw materi-
als or manufactured goods resulting from a joint venture over a much
longer term. I am sure that both sides are giving a great deal of thought
to the practical wisdom of becoming so heavily involved with both
economic and political cooperation with each other, although I person-
ally feel convinced that such international cooperation, if undertaken in
a spirit of mutual trust, is a good and an essential element.
Another area that tends to lead to difficulties is that of communica-
tion. The average capitalist trading organization probably approaches
the communist countries' markets from the standpoint of making a
killing-a profit. Alas, things are not that simple. It's not for me to say
what the motivations of the communist trade are, but they can be a little
different. Of course, they want to sell at a profit, and they think they
can. Of course, they want to buy at the least possible price. But they're
trading on behalf of the state. They are accountable to the state for their
actions. They are carrying state plans and using state finances. There
must be no risk to the state. The foreign trade must, ideally, come off
second best.
I suggested earlier that the time scale in the operations of trade
practiced by state controlled countries can give rise to difficulty. Just
about everything to do with day-to-day trade takes a great deal longer
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there than it does in my country. For example, if one pessimistically
hopes to sign a contract in one month, one had better hope for three. If
one expects to make eight business trips a day in Moscow, one had
better be prepared to make only four. I think that this has a lot to do
with one of the main areas of difficulties-that of communication.
Many of them are really problems that result from a difference in the
form of communication. Of course, there are difficulties in physical
transportation. Although Moscow is only three hours from Paris, the
process of getting a visa to visit the USSR can be very involved. Written
communicatons from Eastern Europe tend to take a long time coming.
They are quite often dated three or four weeks prior to the time they
actually arrive.
It certainly is important to be able to speak an East European lan-
guage and, in fact, the more the better.
Finally on this question of communications, COMECON purchasers
are not particularly wide open to what we would call normal sales
promotional activities, such as advertising, and they are particularly not
susceptible to the hard sell. They can, however, be reached through the
technical press and through technical expositions and trade fairs. But
this, of course, takes a little bit longer.
I have had the good fortune to be engaged in transactions with the
Soviet Union since about 1965. I say good fortune because I really
consider this type of trade to be a most interesting and absorbing one,
and one that forms a philosophical and academic bridge as well as ties
that are purely economic and commercial. My transactions have been
as widespread with the Russians as from the ministers on the one hand
to officials in textiles on the other hand. In many of my contacts, I
encountered suspicion of my motives and intentions, purely from unfa-
miliarity and from preconceived ideas about what a representative of a
large capitalist monopoly company would have to be like. Why in the
world did I want to cooperate with them except to steal their treasures?
Well, it took a year or two to break down these mental barriers and
convince them of my sincerity. The next development was a very vigor-
ous good will offensive on their part, and I just about had to learn to
keep my head above vodka without them stealing my treasures. And
they certainly did try. I survived that, they then threatened to chunk my
product in favor of my competitors who, they said, offered them much
better prices, delivery terms and discounts and so on and so on and other
inducements. And this was really a difficult thing to ignore, particularly
when so much of what they said was true. One just had to dig in and
pull one's socks up.
Eventually, after considerable government work by both sides, there
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was a protocol signed or some unwritten agreements concluded, and this
tends to make things easier, and then negotiations slowly proceeded to
the next level involving money and terms and talks of extra deals.
I won't bore you with the nature of the handling of negotiations, and
I mean not to suggest conclusions. But perhaps I might mention some
aspects of the negotiations which have been in force over the last eight
years or so.
Firstly, I always found that they have never entered negotiations
unless they thought they had more to gain than I had. However, they
always tried to convince me that they were doing me a favor by agreeing
to negotiate at all. There is no doubt that seven or eight years ago
foreign trading practices were rather less sophisticated, but this is cer-
tainly not the case now.
Secondly, the COMECON countries have become far more conscious
of the powerful trading position which they actually do have, and they
are learning very rapidly indeed how to use that power in their dealings
with Western traders. They do, of course, enjoy the tremendous advan-
tage of being able to play off not only one capitalist country against
another-and they are past masters at that-but also one country's
traders against other traders. Of course, they not only do that but they
are doing it well and are being helped by us Westerners who are running
all over one another to get a part of the spoils which we apparently
convinced ourselves exist. This is what strikes one, and I believe that
we are really being put on our mettle. I think that it will do us good if
we don't lose our heads. One has heard it said that if the Soviet Union
did not exist it would have to be invented, but there is no sense in just
handing everything over on a plate simply in order to put one over on
his competitor.
Thirdly, it always used to worry me how long negotiations have to
take, how the Russians could allow so much time to slip by without
making decisions. But I gradually realized how they actually use time
to their advantage. I started by being a bit too eager to cross the middle,
but now I've learned to take a very much longer view in my negotiating
position than I used to.
If I may briefly touch on the human side, the individuals that I had
contacts with were nearly always very friendly and basically interested
in the same things that I was, although they looked at the problem from
a different viewpoint. They take pride in a job well done, particularly if
they can acquire merit in the eyes of their colleagues for having scored
an economic victory. I find, too, that they are remarkably well in-
formed about the aspects of negotiations which really matter. They will
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suddenly be tough and difficult to work with. They seem to respect
toughness in their opponents, and I think that they have very little
respect for too considerate a trader. They are, as a rule, perhaps, more
mercurial than some of their COMECON partners, and one or two of
them can enter a revolving door behind you and come out in front.
In conclusion I would just like to make a few general points. It is no
good any more thinking that the COMECON states are sitting there
crying out for intercourse with the capitalist world and that all they will
pay for exports are cheap raw materials. This is very often not the case.
They are concerned, however, with selectively importing high technol-
ogy and equipment, buying luxuries and producing export quality goods
acceptable to more countries in the West. They are becoming increas-
ingly well placed in this field and they will use, of course, whatever
political or economic riches that are available to them. They will not
be looking for any favors, nor will they be granting any. If you can just
put yourself in their position for a few moments, beginning with your
contacts with them, it will be much easier to avoid the waste of expendi-
ture of much material and mental effort. The practical realities that I
have talked about are not, it seems to me, such as would lead one to a
pessimistic attitude towards developing trade with state controlled econ-
omies. On the contrary, a restrained, farsighted and confident approach
is likely to be more successful than an impetuous short term and
chauvinistic one.
I would like to leave you with this story about the traveling circus
which came to an East European capital. They came to the strong man
act, and the strong man got up on the stage and bent a few iron bars
and tore a few telephone directories in half. Then his assistant brought
on the table a glass and a lemon, and the strong man took out this lemon
and squeezed it over the glass. Sweat stood on his brow and his muscles
knotted as he filled that glass half full with the juice. He turned to the
audience and said, "Would anybody like to try and do better on this?"
And then a small, distinguished, elderly man got up from back, picked
up the same lemon and looked at it for a bit. Then he held it over the
glass and gently squeezed out the juice, and the glass spilled over. The
audience was fascinated by this and said, "Who is this guy?" And they
were told, "That is the Minister of Foreign Trade."
REMARKS OF MR. DAVID WINTER*
Under a foreign trade monopoly system, only certain organizations
*A comprehensive article on the practical realities of dealing with socialist economics by Mr.
Winter will appear in Volume 4, No. 2 of the Ga. J. Int'l & Comp. L.
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are allowed to engage in foreign trade. The legal considerations involved
in dealing with such a system are many and diverse, and the structure
of trade in this area contains both formal and practical elements.
The East European countries as a whole contain over 15 percent of
the world's land area and over 340 million of its people. These countries
can be viewed as a bloc for the following reasons. They share a similar
ideological background, and factors which influence trade decisions are
much the same throughout. Prices in Eastern Europe often do not
reflect world market prices. Foreign trade is monopolized in these
countries by the relatively small number of foreign trade corporations
or companies, which geneally act as intermediaries between the western
seller and the end user in the socialist country. Eastern Europe has
characteristically sold raw materials to the West and imported
manufactured goods.
The future of trade with the East European countries appears to call
for increased reliance on licensing and cooperation agreements, as well
as a likely increase in joint ventures involving the transfer of technology
and marketing techniques. Finally, transactions with the socialist coun-
tries tend to be very large. The lawyer who practices in East-West trade
is faced on the one hand with often enormously valuable and complex
contracts. He is, therefore, inclined to protect his client in every way
possible. On the other hand, to transact with the eastern countries he
must be flexible and in many cases reduce to the bare minimum the legal
protection his client needs. As a practical example, the Soviet trading
corporation, V/O Licensintorg, specializes in such matters as technol-
ogy and the transfer of patents. It acts as an intermediary between the
foreign importer and the internal Soviet enterprise which eveloped the
technology but which has no right to make foreign trade contracts. The
practical difficulties of such a structure, though, are usually more appar-
ent than real.
In some eastern countries this rigid structure is giving way somewhat
to the decentralization of the foreign trade planning system. Certain
internal Hungarian enterprises, for example, are allowed to trade for
their own needs on a limited basis. But the western trader must always
be careful to see that the party he deals with is acting within the scope
of his authority.
There are several practical aspects of contract drafting that should be
noted. Practice has shown that contracts should be highly detailed but
simply expressed. The socialists are very much performance oriented,
and conditions should be clearly expressed and understood. Penalty
clauses should be drafted with care and should provide terms of liqui-
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dated damages. The Western trader must also pay careful attention to
force majeure, law of the contract, and choice of forum clauses. East
Europeans can be relied on to abide by the terms of an arbitration
award, and the possibility of an East European party pleading sovereign
immunity is remote.
In conclusion, problems regarding contracts between western firms
and East European enterprises are no different than those pertaining to
any international contract. Possibly there are fewer problems in most
situations, but there do exist special considerations which may cause
difficulty. These difficulties, however, are normally resolved amicably,
and with very few exceptions, East European countries do not dishonor
their obligations. Further, the size of the orders makes these enterprises
immensely valuable customers. Once the eastern enterprise has confid-
ence in the western firms, repeat business comes almost automatically
and business dealings with similar enterprises in other countries in East-
ern Europe can be expected to increase.
QUESTIONS OF THE PANEL BY THE AUDIENCE
QUESTION: After the contract is signed, what is the course of Soviet
performance with respect to the installation of plants, especially in such
matters as housing for engineers and delivery of the goods?
MR. RUSSELL: Generally, all the amenities the western trader wishes to
have provided by the Soviets for his workers must be spelled out in the
contract. Soviet officials are usually unwilling to grant concessions not
provided for in the contract.
QUESTION: Are there general conditions that Soviet or socialist enter-
prises insist on placing within the contracts which they handle?
MR. WINTER: Yes. Soviet foreign trade corporations will produce a
contract containing general conditions but many clauses within it are
negotiable. It is a good negotiating point to produce your contract
before your Soviet partner produces his. It is best to take a Russian
form and adapt it to the practicalities of your own position. Also, it is
a very good idea to divide the pages of the contract in two, with the left
side in Russian and the right side in English. One must be careful that
the translation is correct.
QUESTION: Are there organized courses in the legal principles of East-
West trade in the law schools of Great Britain or the continent?
MR. WINTER: No, but there are courses on Soviet law.
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QUESTION: What is the form of guarantee typically required by the
Soviets?
MR. WINTER: Generally, in large contracts, the Soviets retain a certain
percentage, usually about ten percent, of all payments until performance
is completed properly. Also, there are all the usual equipment warran-
ties. As far as payment itself is concerned, sometimes a letter of credit
is issued; sometimes payment is guaranteed by the Bank of Foreign
Trade. Often, however, no payment guarantee is required at all because
the credit of the Soviet Union and many East European countries is
among the highest in he world.
QUESTION: What methods are used to familiarize the businessmen of the
East and West with their counterparts on the opposite side of the
Atlantic?
MR. VAN DEN HEUVEL: The Germans are best at this. They have estab-
lished private institutions which conduct special courses on East-West
trade developments.
QUESTION: Do attorneys generally participate in negotiations with
socialist enterprises or are negotiating results referred to lawyers who
ing states and investors.
MR. RUSSELL: Generally a lawyer is not called in until negotiations
reach a certain point between the Ministry or trading organization and
the western firm.
MR. WINTER: Lawyers are usually called in when the contract is ready
for signing. Often lawyers are not called in.
MR. HODGKINS: From my experience I would recommend that a lawyer
be present throughout negotiations.
MR. RUSK: Very often the common law lawyer who is used to dealing
within the adversary process will leave it to the opposing lawyer to take
care of himself with respect to the fine print and meaning of the lan-
guage. Is it fair to say that in negotiating in Eastern Europe one must
make very clear to his opposite number what he means?
MR. WINTER: That is a perfectly fair statement. In this respect it is very
valuable for a lawyer to have command of an East European language
or German. Although interpreters are excellent, they get tired after days
of negotiation and interpret things in their own manner.
QUESTION: In transactions with the eastern enterprises do you normally
associate a local lawyer to assist with local law?
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MR. WINTER: I have never associated a local attorney.
QUESTION: In preparation for dealing with socialist companies how
important is a historical and cultural study of the people as opposed to
a strictly legal or business study?
MR. VAN DEN HEUVEL: Psychological studies and understanding are of
the greatest importance. For example, the two Germanies have been
separated for only 20 years, but the differences in communicating with
them are enormous.
QUESTION: What are the prospects of the Soviets undertaking with
western firms joint ventures in oil operations?
MR. RUSSELL: Although the Soviet Union may have oil and gas to
spare, most is located in inaccessible places. The Soviet Union is now
reluctant to offer raw materials in exchange for western hard currency.
There are two probable reasons for this. First, demand for oil is increas-
ing faster than Soviet production. Second, the Soviet Union wants tech-
nology, equipment, expertise, and very long-term credits. The western
partner would be expected to contribute a vast amount of credit, which
would be paid for over a period of 15 to 20 years. The western partner
would also be expected to supply the know how and tchnology and go
into the field for some time. One has to take into consideration the price
of energy during the intervening 15 to 20 years. Although much thought
is given about the advisibility of joint ventures, often it depends on the
location and type of venture involved. The Soviets are probably more
interested in off-shore rather than on-shore ventures.
QUESTION: What shape would the joint venture take?
MR. WINTER: There would be no joint venture in a true western sense,
chiefly because of philosophical and political considerations. The lack
of control and inability to own property does not mean, however, a less
desirable result for western firms. There are many variations in joint
venture arrangements. Generally, the western partner would put in
know how, machinery and money, and the East European partner will
provide the buildings, land and personnel. Both parties would share in
the profits and marketing.
QUESTION: Do you recommend the use of specialized European agencies
and trading houses to represent American exporters?
MR. RUSSELL: It depends on the nature of the business. For example,
when dealing in a straightforward commodity transaction, agents may
be used successfully. Although the organizations do a thoroughly good
job, direct contact is in nearly all cases preferable.
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MR. HODGKINS: Would you recommend specialists in switch and barter
transactions?
MR. RUSSELL: Yes. A trader can set up his own switch and barter
operation, and often this is not as difficult as it appears, or he can rely
on the expertise of one of these specialized trading houses. These houses
are very useful if the decision to include switch or barter goods comes
at the eleventh hour.
QUESTION: What do you consider to be a meaningful guarantee against
such hazards as expropriation, nationalization, or restriction on the
repatriation of proceeds?
MR. WINTER: These are not really meaningful hazards.
MR. HODGKINS: The socialist countries adhere strictly to bargains they
have made.
QUESTION: Can you describe Soviet efforts to facilitate movement into
and out of the country? How difficult is it to obtain visas?
MR. RUSSELL: A resident of Great Britain must submit a visa applica-
tion ten days in advance with a voucher stating that he has accomoda-
tions booked in the Soviet Union. When absolutely necessary, there
should be little difficulty in moving rapidly within the country and
receiving full cooperation from the Soviet embassy.
QUESTION: What is the value of advertising in the Soviet Union, and
what Soviet efforts have been made to increase access to one's Soviet
counterpart?
MR. RUSSELL: Advertising is most effective through technical journals,
and it is best that the advertisement have a high technical content.
However, the Soviet Committee on Science and Technology is very well
informed about western technology, so advertising is of minimal value.
It would be more advantageous to visit trade fairs and exhibitions where
the western trader can meet the end user of his product. It is also
possible to meet end users by visiting Soviet factories and research
institutions.
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